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Abstract: There is an underappreciated existentialist side to Deleuze’s 
philosophy, which frequently addresses the question of the best mode 
of existence, and consistently does so in explicit dialogue with 
Kierkegaard. Where Kierkegaard conceptualizes the possibility of 
authenticity in terms of the knight of faith, Deleuze arrives at a more 
impersonal notion of authenticity as an act which results in a work of 
art purged from subjective connotations. 
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Introduction 
 
n the Fall of 1945, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Tournier attended Sartre’s 
famous speech “Existentialism is a Humanism.” The two friends were 
horrified by Sartre’s defense of human freedom and responsibility in 
terms reminiscent of 18th century Enlightenment thought: “we were floored. 
So our master had had to dig through the trash to unearth this worn-out 
mixture reeking of sweat and of the inner life of humanism.”1 This 
momentary shock eventually transformed into permanent disappointment: 
even though he kept crediting Sartre as an inspiration, the only works 
Deleuze ever repudiated were precisely a number of Sartrean articles written 
in the 1940s.  
These anecdotes are well known among Deleuze scholars, which may 
explain why Deleuze’s relation to existentialism remains underappreciated.2 
A handful of texts analyze his relation to Sartre, but not a single one explores 
Deleuze’s connection to that other famous existentialist: the Danish 
philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. This is surprising because Deleuze makes 
                                                 
1 François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari – Intersecting lives (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 95. 
2 Several exceptions exploring the Sartre-Deleuze connection include Boundas (1993), 
Khalfa (2000), and Somers-Hall (2006). 
I 
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frequent use of Kierkegaard’s thought in ways that go far beyond casual 
referencing.3 From Difference and Repetition to A Thousand Plateaus and 
beyond, Deleuze consistently works with and through Kierkegaard whenever 
he arrives at questions of the good life or of the best mode of existence. 
I aim to trace this relation to Kierkegaard for two reasons.4 First, 
Deleuze’s ethics are generally held to be a blend between Stoic 
disengagement, Spinozist beatitude, and Nietzschean affirmation.5 Though 
this is not incorrect, it is certainly incomplete. The recipe needs to be 
supplemented with a fourth, existentialist ingredient that concerns the 
criteria for the result of our actions, in addition to our attitude towards them.6 
Second, this explication will clarify Deleuze’s frequent yet ever vague 
insistence that art is simultaneously at the heart of life and of ethics. 
The problem of “a” life 
In the essay Immanence: A Life, Deleuze repeatedly insists that life is 
best lived as a life, emphasizing the fourth person singular.7 Though this late 
essay emphasizes the notion of a life with unprecedented force, it was already 
introduced in The Logic of Sense, becoming increasingly explicit in and after 
the publication of A Thousand Plateaus.8 Yet what does it mean? How to do it? 
Moreover, why do it? Deleuze is not particularly forthcoming in answering 
such questions, since his explanation consists in introducing a swirl of 
unfamiliar neologisms, including “affect,” “asignifying sign,” “becoming-
imperceptible,” “the restoration of immanence,” and “infinite speed.” Yet this 
                                                 
3 In his magnum opus Difference and Repetition, Deleuze explicitly states that his 
conceptualization of repetition amounts to “following Kierkegaard’s wish to carry out the 
reconciliation of the singular with the general.” Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by 
P. Patton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 25. 
4 To be clear: this text is not an exegetic work on Kierkegaard. Deleuze only refers to 
Fear and Trembling, Repetition and some passages from the Papirer, a mere part of Kierkegaard’s 
oeuvre. I will ignore the question of whether Deleuze’s reading of Kierkegaard is adequate, 
focusing instead on how Deleuze transforms Kierkegaard to fit his own problems. For a 
Kierkegaardian response to Deleuze’s reading, see Clar’s text from 1975. 
5 For example, see James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense - A Critical Introduction 
and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
6 Deleuze’s Nietzschean side has always emphasized activity (see his frequent 
references to Nietzsche and “dancing” in Difference and Repetition). Adding a Kierkegaardian 
element to the mix, so to say, would then create a nice balance of two “passive” or contemplative 
aspects and two “active” aspects to Deleuzian ethics. 
7 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness - Texts and Interviews 1975-1995, trans. by A. 
Hodges and M. Taormina (Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e) / MIT Press, 2007), 384. 
8 Gilles Deleuze, The logic of sense, trans. by M. Lester (London: Athlone Press, 1990), 
102-103. 
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is where Kierkegaard comes in.9 Deleuze’s discussions on a life and the 
associated neologisms just mentioned are permeated with references to and 
use of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and Repetition, and it is with a detour 
through these texts that we can uncover Deleuze’s intentions.10 
Life as a knight of faith 
Fear and Trembling and Repetition famously address the problem of 
how to become an authentic self. According to Kierkegaard this is a matter of 
purging our motives for acting of all contingency and temporal displacement. 
Only a relation of each present to an absolute can serve as sufficient ground to 
grant authenticity to our existence. Kierkegaard identifies four contingent 
modes of acting that must be avoided if such a relation with the absolute is to 
be attained.11 
The first is recollection. To act out of recollection means to long for the 
restoration of a contingent past, so that the present will always fall short and 
disappoint. Recollection is a “discarded garment that does not fit,”12 a mode 
of living that stops life dead in its tracks by “an undoing of movement and a 
reversal of [life’s] course, a trying to get back to the point prior to 
movement.”13 The second is hope. To hope means to act on an envisioned 
                                                 
9 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition, trans. and ed. by H.V. Hong and 
E.H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983). [Fear and Trembling will be 
subsequently cited as FT, while Repetition as R, followed by section then page number] 
10 To give two examples: “... what does becoming-imperceptible signify? [ ... ] 
Becoming-imperceptible means many things. What is the relation between the (anorganic) 
imperceptible, the (asignifying) indiscernible, and the (asubjective) impersonal? A first response 
would be: to be like everybody else. That is what Kierkegaard relates in his story about the 
“knight of the faith,” the man of becoming: to look at him, one would notice nothing, a bourgeois, 
nothing but a bourgeois [ ... ]: after a real rupture, one succeeds in being just like everybody else.” 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2, trans. by 
B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 279; “become like everyone, but 
in fact you have turned the “everyone” into a becoming. You have become imperceptible, 
clandestine [ ... ]. Despite the different tones, it is a little like the way in which Kierkegaard 
describes the knight of faith [ ... ]: the knight no longer has segments of resignation [ ... ], he 
resembles rather a bourgeois, a tax collector, [ ... ] he blends into the wall but the wall has become 
alive, he is painted grey on grey.” Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. by H. 
Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 127. Also see A 
Thousand Plateaus, 171, 197, 282, 543 n.66 and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, trans. by H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 73-74. 
11 And not just two, as is often thought. For Kierkegaard, “Hope” and “Recollection” 
are just as problematic as “Aesthetic” and “Ethic” existence. 
12 R III, 174. 
13 John D. Caputo, “Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Foundering of Metaphysics,” in 
R. L. Perkins ed., International Kierkegaard Commentary - Fear and Trembling and Repetition (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1993), 208. 
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future that may never become reality. Whereas recollection is too “backward” 
to live up to the present, hope is too “forward.” The third contingent mode is 
the aesthetic mode of existence, or to justify actions in terms of desires and 
sentiments one just happens to have.14 It refers to acts in which we pay no 
mind to others, a foreclosure from the public sphere, which leads Kierkegaard 
to call this mode “hidden.” The fourth is the ethical mode, which Kierkegaard 
calls “disclosed” and “universal.” It is to act in accordance with the normative 
framework of a society, rendering actions intelligible to all in principle. The 
ethical mode still cannot yield authentic selfhood, as it never grants certainty 
as to whether we are not just acting in order to be appreciated by others, 
which would reduce a person to a “limb of a larger body.”15 Kierkegaard 
gives the example of Agamemnon’s intended sacrifice of his daughter to 
ensure favorable winds for the Greek fleet heading for Troy.16 Even though 
Agamemnon concedes his private interests to the universal, this cannot make 
him an authentic self. He remains driven by the need to conform to societal 
values that pertain to a contingent Greek universe. 
These four modes can of course inspire noble and beautiful actions, 
yet they risk the surrender of one’s life. Aesthetically, to worldly distractions; 
ethically, to social conformity; in recollection, to dreams of a past; in hope, to 
longing for a future. Instead of hoping or recollecting, Kierkegaard insists that 
we repeat: “he who will merely hope is cowardly; he who will merely recollect 
is voluptuous; he who wills repetition is a man, and the more emphatically 
he is able to realize it, the more profound a human being he is.”17 Instead of 
acting aesthetically or ethically, he insists on a religious mode of existence, the 
only one in which one can be a “single individual.”18 This single individual is 
the knight of faith, certain of authentic selfhood precisely because he abandons 
all contingency in favor of “an absolute relation with the absolute.”19 Who is 
this knight of faith who repeats, and how is the relation with the absolute 
attained? To answer these questions, Kierkegaard famously employs the 
example of Abraham. 
                                                 
14 This makes for ‘slaves of the finite” are “frogs in the swamp of life” and 
“benchwarmers that live absorbed in worldly joys (FT III, 91-92), stuck in an “aesthetic illusion” 
(FT III, 135) of disdainful “bourgeois philistinism” (FT III, 89). 
15 David Gouwens, “Understanding, imagination, and irony in Kierkegaard’s 
Repetition,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary - Fear and Trembling and Repetition, 14. Also 
see “no one becomes an authentic self simply by absorbing the values of one’s society.” Stephen 
Evans, “Faith as the telos of morality: a reading of Fear and trembling,” in ibid., 25; it is 
“unacceptable to make a goal of being approved by other people” Morris, T. F., “Constantin 
Constantius” search for an acceptable way of life,” in ibid., 333. 
16 FT III, 108. 
17 R III, 174. 
18 FT III, 105, 111, 124. 
19 FT III, 106. Note that Kierkegaard thus counterintuitively aligns universality with 
contingency, and opposes them to absoluteness and necessity. 
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As is written, God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. 
According to Kierkegaard, Abraham transcends the aesthetic and the ethical 
by obeying God without hesitation. He does not perform the sacrifice for his 
own sake (aesthetics) or for the benefit of his family (ethics).20 This is further 
confirmed by Abraham’s concealment of his intentions to his loved ones. An 
aesthetic silence would have been intended to prevent the slaying by 
pretending that nothing had happened, not to help bring it about.21 Ethically 
speaking silence is not even a possibility, because the ethical mode requires 
by definition that one justifies actions in terms of common sense.22 Abraham 
must act utterly alone since his intentions are in principle unintelligible for 
others: though religiously he is about to sacrifice, ethically he is about to 
commit murder.23 Yet this ambiguity does not yet make a knight of faith. 
Abraham only deserves this title insofar as he has the absurd faith that by 
abandoning everything he will regain what he resigns: 
 
But to be able to lose one’s understanding and along 
with it everything finite, for which it is the stockbroker, 
and then to win the very same finitude again by virtue 
of the absurd—this appalls me, but that does not make 
me say it is something inferior, since, on the contrary, it 
is the one and only marvel.24 
 
The knight of faith makes a twofold movement: surrendering the 
finite and then seeing it restored by virtue of the absurd (God intervening at 
the very last moment to save Isaac). This second part is crucial. Had Abraham 
stopped after the first part (accepting the sacrifice of his son without absurdly 
believing that Isaac would be restored to him), then he would merely be a 
“knight of infinite resignation.” Resignation still relies on an ethical 
understanding that there is something that, unpleasant as it may be, has to be 
done.25 However, by absurdly believing that surrendering the finite will still 
result in the restoration of the finite, Abraham moves beyond understanding 
and resignation. This “leap” is absurd and paradoxical and thought cannot 
penetrate it, not in the last place because it places a single individual higher 
than the universal. Thus, Abraham becomes an authentic self, a single 
individual living a present in an absolute relation with the absolute. When 
                                                 
20 “For Abraham the ethical had no higher expression than family life.” FT III, 158. 
21 FT III, 158. 
22 “Abraham [ ... ] cannot speak. As soon as I speak, I express the universal, and if I do 
not do so, no one can understand me.” FT III, 110. 
23 FT III, 61-64, 66-67, 73, 82, 120. 
24 FT III, 87. 
25 FT III, 97.  
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everything finite is restored to him after his leap of faith, he can be certain that 
he is neither driven by selfish gain, nor by societal norms.26 This is because he 
repeats, and we now understand that to repeat is to regain what one has 
surrendered earlier. Repetition allows for authenticity through the certainty 
that one is not a slave to aesthetics, ethics, recollection, or hope, that one 
cannot be reduced to a private individual or a social subject.27 Only in this 
mode of existence can existence be called “earnest” for Kierkegaard.28 This 
leaping into an earnest existence is the first of two themes Deleuze adopts 
from the Danish philosopher.29 
The second is Kierkegaard’s description of “how the knight of faith 
should be played.”30 Kierkegaard emphasizes how utterly devoid of spectacle 
it would be to see a knight of faith. Indeed, we would exclaim: “Good Lord, 
is this the man, is this really the one—he looks just like a tax collector!”31 Glory 
and public recognition befall knights of infinite resignation, not knights of 
faith. The former can be publically staged as paragons of virtue, and we cry 
for them in sympathy because their actions correspond to our values.32 And 
even though with every breath, the knight of faith “buys the opportune time 
at the highest price, for he does not do even the slightest thing except by 
virtue of the absurd,” there is nothing spectacular in watching him do it.33 The 
very marvel of faith according to Kierkegaard is that its movement is a mode 
of existence in which all of life, including its most common and trivial aspects, 
is restored to a person who thereby becomes a self, having left behind all other 
modes of existence or attitudes to life that would have subjected him to past, 
future, social doxa, or private passion. Hence, a knight of faith exists “in such 
a way that [his] contrast to existence constantly expresses itself as the most 
beautiful and secure harmony with it,” as “the only happy man, the heir to 
the finite.”34 
                                                 
26 FT III, 106, 120. 
27 “Only the religious movement remains as the true expression for repetition ... ” R, 
302, Pap. IV B112 n.d., 1843-1844; “repetition is transcendent, a religious movement by virtue of 
the absurd”, R, 305, Pap. IV B112 n.d., 1843-1844. 
28 R III, 133. Nevertheless, ethics does not contradict faith by definition and faith does 
not always demand acting in violation of ethics. Kierkegaard merely asserts that faith is superior 
to ethics and irreducible to it, not that it annuls it. 
29 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 127, 282; What is philosophy?, 74; Deleuze, 
Difference and repetition, 11, 95; Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1 - The Movement Image, trans. by H. 
Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1986), 114-116. 
30 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 9; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 197, 
279. 
31 FT III, 90. 
32 FT III, 89, 110, 115. 
33 FT III, 91. 
34 FT III, 100. 
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These two figures, a movement putting a single individual in relation 
to something absolute, and simultaneously retaining a completely normal 
presence in the world, deeply influence Deleuze in conceptualizing a 
preferable mode of existence. Simultaneously, his version of the problem of 
becoming a single individual, or, in his terminology, living a life in the fourth 
person singular, still differs from Kierkegaard’s. How could it be otherwise 
when Deleuze demands a strict atheism in life and philosophy?35 
Abraham becomes Cain 
As with Kierkegaard’s disavowal of recollection, Deleuze asserts that 
“history today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they 
may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order 
to create something new.”36 Where Kierkegaard dismisses the ethical and 
aesthetic modes of existence, Deleuze also demands “a determination purely 
of thinking and of thought that wrests [existential modes] from the historical 
state of affairs of a society and the lived experience of individuals” in a 
“struggle against opinion.”37 And in a striking parallel with the knight of faith 
whose absurd faith cannot be adequately spoken of, Deleuze asserts that the 
most admirable mode of existence is one that cannot be judged: “better to be 
a road-sweeper than a judge”;  
 
… herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence 
and not to judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not 
because everything is of equal value, but on the contrary 
because what has value can be made or distinguished 
only by defying judgment.38  
 
With such similarities, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard’s knight 
of faith is Deleuze’s primary association when inquiring into the preferable 
mode of existence.39 Yet this first response is no satisfying answer. Deleuze 
                                                 
35 “Atheism is the philosopher’s serenity and philosophy’s achievement.” Deleuze and 
Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 92; “Pluralism is the properly philosophical way of thinking, the 
one principle of a violent atheism.” Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and philosophy, trans. by H. 
Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 4; “Religions are worth much less than 
the nobility and the courage of the atheisms which they inspire.” Deleuze, Two Regimes of 
Madness, 360. 
36 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 96. 
37 Ibid., 70, 203. 
38 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, 8; Shunning judgment by others and rejoicing in 
meeting someone who does not judge are also key themes in Repetition. See Morris’ “Constantin 
Constantius” search for an acceptable way of life,” especially pages 321-324: “Here was an 
actuality that was not concerned with judging him ... .” 
39 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 279. 
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agrees with Kierkegaard on which modes must be avoided, but cannot accept 
a religious movement of faith as a solution: 
 
Undoubtedly, faith possesses sufficient force to undo 
habit and reminiscence [ ... ] However, faith invites us to 
rediscover once and for all God and the self in common 
resurrection. [ ... ] This is [Kierkegaard’s] problem: the 
betrothal of a self rediscovered and a God recovered, in 
such a manner that it is no longer possible truly to escape 
from either the condition or the agent.40 
 
By relying on God to restore the finite, the knight of faith is 
immediately propelled back into the very conditions of private habit and 
social mores that he needed to flee in the first place. For Kierkegaard, this is 
the beauty of absurd faith. For Deleuze, it is a disappointment: one escapes, 
only to rediscover oneself bound to the finite tighter than ever before.41 Yet 
Deleuze does not intend to critique Kierkegaard as much as he wants to point 
out that Kierkegaard’s solution falls short in Deleuze’s own version of 
Kierkegaard’s problem: 
 
Kierkegaard’s “knight of the faith,” he who makes the 
leap, are men [sic] of a transcendence or a faith. But they 
constantly recharge immanence [ ... ], with the infinite 
immanent possibilities brought by the one who believes 
that God exists. The problem would change if it were 
another plane of immanence. It is not that the person 
who does not believe God exists would gain the upper 
hand [ ... ]. But, on the new plane, it is possible that the 
problem now concerns the one who believes in the 
world, and not even in the existence of the world but in 
its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once 
again to give birth to new modes of existence [ ... ]. It may 
be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our 
most difficult task [ ... ]. The problem has indeed 
changed.42 
 
                                                 
40 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 95. 
41 Kierkegaard aims for a new ground and a “God-relationship restored (and 
enhanced) by the incarnation and atonement of the Son of God.” Vincent McCarthy, 
“Repetition’s repetitions,” in International Kierkegaard commentary - Fear and Trembling and 
Repetition, 277. 
42 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 74-75. 
  
 
106     ART AS AUTHENTIC LIFE 
© 2014 Arjen Kleinherenbrink 
http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_15/kleinherenbrink_december2014.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
Deleuze shifts the parameters of the problem. It now concerns the 
belief in possibilities of movement and new modes of existence in the world. 
Authenticity is then no longer a matter of restoration, but of creation. The 
knight of faith chooses one final mode of existence. Deleuze searches 
something that escapes from private life, social conditions, recollection, and 
hope in a more radical sense: something that can continuously generate 
something unseen, not to restore the finite but to renew it. The obstacle to 
such renewal is precisely transcendence. In everyday life, this can be religious 
or cultural dogma that one is not supposed to question. In philosophy, it is 
the idea of a ground or first principle. Transcendence ensures that all events 
and things are watered down to mere permutations or reconfigurations of 
something already known and established for all eternity. 
Quite obviously, Deleuze counts the religious mode of existence 
among such transcendent structures, and so the problem has changed. 
Becoming an authentic self still requires dismissing personal desire, social 
circumstance, and idealized pasts or futures, but religion has been added to 
this list and all these modes of existence are discounted for being 
contaminated with transcendence and opinion, which limit existence and 
attempt to capture life in clear-cut schemas. The ideal can no longer be the 
tranquil knight of faith; rather, we need a paragon of the creation of ruptures 
in the prisons of life.43 The shining example is no longer Abraham: Deleuze 
chooses Cain as his champion. Cain is “the true man” and a true man is one 
who “never ceases to betray God just as God betrays man.”44 God betrays 
man in representing transcendence par excellence. Absolute and not 
contingent as He may be, God still functions as a displacement of the 
justification of things from outside of themselves, i.e., as a position of 
judgment. Restoration of immanence or allowing for the new without 
pinning life to any limiting principle whatsoever demands that this betrayal 
be betrayed. Such double betrayal is the only way to break with “the doctrine 
of judgment [that] has reversed and replaced the system affects.”45 This 
provides us with the starting point of Deleuze’s solution to his reading of 
Kierkegaard’s problem. The preferable mode of existence breaks with all 
manifestations of stifling opinions and transcendent, untouchable principles, 
including faith. For Deleuze, this entails creating affects, in relation to which 
he introduces a complex series of neologisms. 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 123. 
45 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 129. 
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Affect, sign, fourth person singular 
Affect is introduced to Deleuze’s philosophy in two studies on 
Spinoza. However, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze develops a markedly 
post-Spinozist conceptualization of affect. He starts using the term in 
response to a different problem: no longer Spinoza’s “what can a body do?,” 
but the problem mentioned earlier: the possibility of a world in which new 
modes of existence can emerge.46 Through this shift, affect becomes detached 
from the body: “affects are no longer feelings or affections,” the flesh is now 
considered “too weak” to carry the affect, and affects are now “nonhuman 
becomings of man.”47 If affect is to play a part in breaking with the self and 
with opinion, it must be able to effectuate a power that “throws the self into 
upheaval and makes it reel.”48 It cannot concern a contingent person or body; 
affects must be “impersonal, an alternate current that disrupts signifying 
projects as well as subjective feelings.”49 What must affect be if it is to realize 
such ambitious aims? First of all it is a being and not a process of affection.50 
When asked what type of being this entails, Deleuze answers “art,” because 
only art can declare as its aim “to wrest the affect from affections as the 
transition from one state to another.”51 Affects are not simply encountered in 
nature; their creation is a complex techne, and for Deleuze, it is highly rare 
that a work of art truly creates an affect and manages to stand up on its own.52 
To stand up on its own means that a work of art no longer refers to the lived 
experience of either artist or spectator, that it does not represent particular 
historical circumstances, that it neither recalls a past nor announces a future, 
and hence there is only an affect when the work of art refers to nothing but 
itself: 
 
… the young girl maintains the pose that she has had for 
five thousand years, a gesture that no longer depends on 
whoever made it.53 
 
                                                 
46 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 256. 
47 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 164, 178, 169/173. 
48 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 240. 
49 Ibid., 233. 
50 “Affects are beings.” Deleuze and Guattari, What is philosophy?, 164. 
51 Ibid., 167. 
52 Ibid., 164. This is also how one should understand—“affects always presuppose the 
affections from which they are derived, although they cannot be reduced to them.” Gilles 
Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. by D. W. Smith and M. E. Greco (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 140. 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 163. 
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This becomes Deleuze’s hallmark of authenticity: not so much 
authenticity for the self, but authenticity by the self by virtue of that which is 
created. When successful, this drags the very materials from which the work 
of art is composed into the affect: “[even] the material passes into the 
sensation.”54 Sensations are not affections. A work of art “is a bloc of 
sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects.”55 Affects are 
thus never encountered alone, but always intertwined with percepts. 
Whereas affects are those entities that can generate affections, percepts are 
those entities that can generate perceptions. A work of art as an affect-percept 
compound is thus situated “before” language in the sense that it can come to 
be talked about after being perceived and felt:  
 
… it is an utterable. We mean that, when language gets 
hold of this material (and it necessarily does so), then it 
gives rise to utterances which come to dominate or even 
replace the images and signs, and which refer in turn to 
pertinent features of the language system, syntagms and 
paradigms, completely different from those we started 
with.56  
 
In addition, an affect-percept compound is eternal and thus absolute 
because “even if the material lasts for only a few seconds it will give sensation 
the power to exist and be preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this 
short duration.”57 The creation of affects is an activity of extraction, 
detachment, a cutting of ties with all modes of existence that must be 
dismissed on account of their capacity to enslave or imprison life in 
transcendence and opinion: 
 
The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and 
neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the 
page or canvas is already so covered with preexisting, 
preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to 
clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of 
air from the chaos that brings us the vision [ ... ]. Because 
the picture starts out covered with clichés, the painter 
must confront the chaos and hasten the destruction as to 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 193. 
55 Ibid., 164. 
56 Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 2 - The Time Image, trans. by H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 29. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 166. 
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produce a sensation that defies every opinion and 
cliché.58 
 
This helps to understand what Deleuze means when writing that 
affects respond to a necessity to break through opinion and cliché by 
“creating new, as yet unknown statements [ ... ], asubjective affects, signs 
without signifiance.”59 Affects are asignifying signs because they do not refer 
to or represent something outside of themselves. If a painter manages to 
create an affect, a woman’s smile on a painting no longer has “Lisa’s smile,” 
nor a “typical 16th century expression,” not even a smile consisting of this or 
that specific type of reddish paint. This is not to say that an affect cannot 
signify something; it is to say that an affect does not do so necessarily, and 
that when it does, it is only in a second moment.60 If it does not escape 
immediate signification, it remains firmly stuck in the known, in clichés, 
recognition, and opinion. This also explains Deleuze’s resistance to judgment 
because what else is judgment than to capture something in terms and criteria 
belonging to something else? In the case of affect, this would annul 
everything it can be. A successful affect is an asignifying sign, a double 
betrayal that moves against or simply ignores what is already known and 
accepted, and thus “no [true] art and no sensation have ever been 
representational.”61 If an affect is to be judged, this must happen in terms of 
the affect itself, if such a thing is possible. The power of art lies in the 
possibility of the creation of affects and the power of affects lies in being 
relationally undetermined and hence allowing for the new. From the 
perspective of affect, any way of talking about, characterizing, or interpreting 
a work of art is just one way, and even a multitude of ways can in principle 
never exhaust the asignifying status of the affect. The introduction of affects 
and asignifying signs already provides a sense of what Deleuze is working 
towards. We are now in a position to return to the single individual or the 
fourth person singular: 
 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 204. Also: “everything that novelists must extract from the perceptions, 
affections, and opinions of their psychosocial “models” passes entirely into the percepts and 
affects to which the character must be raised without holding on to any other life.” Ibid., 188. 
59 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 147. 
60 “[Art] is no less independent of the viewer or hearer, who only experience it after, if 
they have the strength for It.” Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 164. 
61 Ibid., 193. Also “... we attain to the percept and affect only as to autonomous and 
sufficient beings that no longer owe anything to those who experience or have experienced 
them.” Ibid., 168; “signs [ ... ] are not signifiers.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 88-
89. 
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We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and 
nothing more.62 
 
In leaving behind all enslaving, stifling modes of existence, affect 
becomes completely singular. It is no longer this or that smile, but simply “a 
smile.” Deleuze borrows the notion of the fourth person singular from the 
poet Lawrence Ferlinghetti. In the latter’s novel Her, the protagonist Andy 
Raffine is obsessed with reaching the fourth person singular. He spends life 
searching for something absolute instead of relative, for a girl exempt from 
the small flaws of real women. Of course, he never finds a girl, but why? It is 
because Andy longs for a thing so pure that he becomes unable to see himself 
“as a component in the viewing process.”63 Andy’s search is doomed from 
the start, precisely because he has the wrong understanding of the fourth 
person singular: he looks for a girl, but still one as conceived of from his 
perspective. However, Her also contains what Ferlinghetti calls the true fourth 
person singular, the “a ... ” that manages to detach itself from the longings 
and desires of a subject.64 Ferlinghetti stages the true fourth person singular 
as the one mode of existence in which disappointment and lack become 
impossible: there is just the presence of a smile. The young girl whose smile 
it is and the spectator moved or unmoved by it are only relevant in a 
secondary sense. Quite understandably, this is an incredibly hard thing to 
achieve: “I keep slipping off [ ... ] because I and no one has the true fourth 
sight to see without the old associational turning eye that turns all it sees into 
its own.”65 
Nevertheless, this is Deleuze’s criterion for authenticity: to leave 
behind all modes of existence that are unable to generate the new. Again, 
Deleuze is approaching Kierkegaard’s problem though in ways that 
Kierkegaard did not. It is no longer a search for a restoration of the Self; it is 
to search for moments of creation beyond the confines of the Self, until there 
is only “the it or the non-person,” “hardly any individuality, but [ ... ] 
singularities, a smile, a gesture, a grimace—such events are not subjective 
traits,” and hence where affect is created, there is only “a belly, a mouth, an 
engine, a thingamabob, a baby.”66 Reaching the point of the indefinite article 
can reduce us to the point where everything we say and think about ourselves 
                                                 
62 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 385. 
63 Lawrence Ianni and Lawrence Ferlinghetti, “Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s Fourth Person 
Singular and the Theory of Relativity,” in Winsconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature, 8:3 (1967), 
396. 
64 Ferlinghetti, Lawrence, Her (New York: New Directions, 1988), 93; Ianni and 
Lawrence, “Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s Fourth Person Singular and the Theory of Relativity,” 400-
401. 
65 Ferlinghetti, Her, 93. 
66 Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, 351, 387, 110. 
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is discarded, if only for a moment “one has combined “everything” (le tout): 
the indefinite article, the infinitive-becoming, and the proper name to which 
one is reduced.”67 This is why Deleuze often remarks that affect operates at 
infinite speed. Not only is art eternal as long as it lasts, it is also something 
detached from the rhythms of everyday life. This clarifies why Deleuze finds 
that so many novels fail to be art, that is, to create affects: too much ink is 
being wasted on recounting private affairs, and too little of it manages the 
desirable detachment, singularity, and reduction: 
 
… the art of the novel [ ... ] is a misunderstanding: many 
people think that novels can be created with our 
perceptions and affections, our memories and archives, 
[ ... ] and finally with our opinions holding it all 
together.68 
Architecture, becoming, imperceptibility 
Deleuze cannot follow Kierkegaard, since the movement of faith 
entails transcendence reinstalled. He thus turns to Cain as the double 
betrayer. The activity by which to carry out such double betrayal and opening 
to the new is art because only art can create something purely for itself. Affects 
are beings: singular, asignifying signs that must be addressed in the fourth 
person singular. And Deleuze does not stop there. As affect cannot depend 
on emotions, feelings, or bodily states, he concludes that “art begins not with 
flesh but with the house.”69 Art is always the activity by which something is 
detached, and such singularization is a matter of framing, of demarcating and 
hence decoupling by means of lines, gestures, windows, beams, glass, and so 
forth. The affect is not found; it must be built. Art is impossible otherwise and 
as such “architecture, the first of the arts.”70 As a consequence, the design of 
buildings is only a subset of a wider architectural domain. For Deleuze, 
architecture concerns all art as the necessary condition for the creation of 
affect. Cinema is a good example here. Framing a face in close-up can show 
fear of resignation as affect. Because of the close-up, context drifts away, and 
as the face itself becomes a landscape that fills the entire screen, the actor’s 
identity dissipates. All that remains is “a” fear or “a” resignation in which the 
affect has been abstracted from all contingent circumstances. At that point, a 
                                                 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280. 
68 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 170. Kierkegaard could not agree more, 
as he insists that an author should not draw too much on personal experience, lest his actuality 
intrude so much that a work becomes mere “private talkativeness.” Fear and Trembling and 
Repetition, 98. 
69 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 186, 189, italics mine. 
70 Ibid., 179. 
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viewer has the rare opportunity to enter into a situation in which there is only 
the fourth person singular. The subject-object distinction is then momentarily 
denied and immanence is “recharged” by a moment of contact with 
something that does not belong to our quotidian experiences. But this is still 
art as a specific practice. How can art and affect be the general mode of 
existence par excellence? Deleuze’s conceptualizations seem to concern very 
isolated moments that will only rarely be created and experienced. The next 
step in the sequence of concepts, however, suggests otherwise when Deleuze 
asserts that: 
 
 ...  you are [ ... ] a set of nonsubjectified affects. You have 
the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life.71 
 
This can be understood by turning to a final concept, that of 
“becoming”: “the house takes part in an entire becoming. It is life, the 
nonorganic life of things.”72 Architecture is part of a movement of becoming, 
which reveals the nonorganic life of things. This refers to things taken as 
asignifying or in the fourth person singular. This is a constant theme in 
Deleuze’s philosophy, where anything functioning within a certain structure 
or system is always doing so in a second moment, conditioned by something 
else. Hence, he writes that “real becomings take refuge in art and sweep it 
away toward the realms of the asignifying, asubjective, and faceless,” and 
that “affects [are] becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through 
them (thereby becoming someone else).”73 Becoming is a movement that 
belongs to raising compositions to affects, to the detachment and 
singularization mentioned earlier. What is becoming in this context of 
sensational compounds of affect and percept? Deleuze answers: 
 
… sensory becoming is the action by which something 
or someone is ceaselessly becoming-other while 
continuing to be what they are.74 
 
How to reconcile becoming-other with continuing to be what one is? 
Becoming is a movement similar to repetition or the movement of faith in 
Kierkegaard: one constantly abandons oneself in favor of something else, but 
this very act allows one to remain oneself. Deleuze intends that the mode of 
existence preferable for human beings is this becoming-other, as the essence 
of selfhood becomes becoming-other: “here begins a long and inexhaustible 
                                                 
71 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 262. 
72 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 180. 
73 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 208. 
74 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 177. 
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story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense.”75 After private 
individuality, social context, and all transcendent illusions and limiting 
grounds are left behind, the only thing remaining is movement itself. With 
Kierkegaard’s knight, this is always done towards and from faith. For him, it 
is raising consciousness “to the second power,” but for Deleuze it is a more 
radical raising of consciousness to what he calls the “nth power,” the double 
betrayal of Cain that unshackles us for the sake of allowing for the new.76 
As with Kierkegaard, this requires no spectacle, since “movement is 
the thing that is imperceptible.”77 The mode of existence of being a set of 
nonsubjectified affects entails a radical transformation from the perspective 
of the life of doxa that Deleuze considers to be the norm, but this 
transformation is not physical. Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, the many 
examples of becomings (becoming-woman, becoming-animal, and so on) are 
always accompanied by the reminder that a man becoming-woman or a child 
becoming-horse does not actually become something else in a direct, literal 
sense. Hence, becoming a set of asubjectified affects can only concern a 
movement on the spot, in other words, a certain attitude or approach to life, 
or again in other words, a preference for a specific mode of existence: an 
attitude. As with Ferlinghetti’s true fourth person singular, maintaining this 
mode of existence is hard, and one might only succeed in it for a fleeting 
moment: 
 
To go unnoticed is by no means easy. To be a stranger, 
even to one’s doorman or neighbors. If it is so difficult to 
be “like” everybody else, it is because it is an affair of 
becoming. Not everybody becomes 
everybody/everything [tout le monde], makes a becoming 
of everybody/everything. This requires much asceticism, 
much sobriety, much creative involution.78 
 
To become tout le monde is to abandon oneself in the precise sense of 
realizing situations in which there is no longer a subject-object distinction, in 
which a morsel of reality is present as “a smile,” not this or that smile that I 
am interpreting. Since this is a movement on the spot, it is like “painting grey 
on grey” or “pink on pink”: it might not change anything physically, yet 
simultaneously it matters tremendously in how one relates to the world.79 
                                                 
75 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 86. 
76 Pap. IV B111 n.d., 1843-1844; R III, 229. Deleuze most notably employs the term “nth 
power” throughout Difference and Repetition. 
77 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 280. 
78 Ibid., 279. 
79 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 11, 197. 
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This reveals two reasons why Deleuze describes true becoming as becoming-
imperceptible. Firstly, it is not visible “from the outside.” Secondly, becoming 
puts us in a zone of indiscernibility, in situations in which there is “a ... ” 
taking place, and therefore in which it is not at all clear where “I” stop and 
“it” starts.80  
At this point, it is clear why Deleuze considers this mode of existence 
as superior to all others. Firstly, it is the only mode in which an event or 
encounter is truly appreciated for what it is, as singular and as unmediated 
by memory, anticipation, norms, values, language, and so forth. It is an 
extremely strict criterion for authenticity, in which even the perspective or 
desire of the subject involved is purged. Secondly, it is the only attitude 
towards life in which something new can come into being. Only from the 
fourth person singular can one say that something, which is then to be taken 
as an affect, is not a mere reconfiguration of pre-existing components. Thirdly, 
and more generally, much of Deleuze’s thought is dedicated to 
demonstrating that the self or subject is not given a priori, and concepts such 
as affect and becoming are part of his endeavor of describing a world of 
experiences and encounters that is more fundamental than our “normal” way 
of seeing things, a world that is in fact constitutive of this normality. Hence, 
for Deleuze, the preferable mode of existence, of being a self, is an attitude in 
which one tries to have encounters that put the self beyond the self, that make 
becoming-other as an always present yet mostly unnoticed constitutive 
process, tangible, if only for a moment.  
Conclusion 
How to look at a work of art? With a cynical, weary eye that can only 
see it as resembling other art, as when we utter the cliché that “everything 
has already been done a thousand times before”? If so, then there is no art, 
just images. For Deleuze, the same is true for living a life. We can easily live 
life as though everything derives from circumstance, from history, or from 
others. This is life devoid of authenticity. But if so, then there is no life worth 
living, or at least no possible future worth entering. To Deleuze, the Cainite 
mode of existence, the double betrayal that allows for singular encounters 
unshackled from circumstance, is our only chance of experiencing moments 
in which something new is created.81 And the experience of the new is 
preferable, precisely because it is the only experience that is not (yet) captured 
in orders of transcendence, whether common sense and opinion or the 
edifices and first principles of philosophy. It is the only mode of existence in 
                                                 
80 This is how one should read “what cannot be perceived on one [level] cannot but be 
perceived on the other.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 281. 
81 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 97. 
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which “immanence can be restored”, resulting in “Man par excellence.” But 
this is precisely Man capable of severing his own involvement from the mode of 
existence of that which is produced, i.e., art. It must be emphasized that such 
moments cannot be forced: an individual subject cannot go out and “decide” 
to have an encounter with the new. Instead, one can only experiment and try 
to seek it out: “make consciousness an experimentation in life.”82 If this does 
not strike us as a very practical or concrete rule by which to live, it is only 
because it is first and foremost an encouragement to cultivate a certain 
attitude. The entire emphasis on viewing ourselves and others as art, on 
viewing art as affect, and on understanding affect as an utterable or perceivable 
is intended for this: an attitude in life in which we refuse to first see a problem, 
a situation, a person, or any other concrete thing in terms of that which it is 
not. This is why Deleuze so frequently cries out against stereotypes and 
popular opinion, and also why his philosophy has always resonated well 
with those who resist racism, sexism, and all other forms of essentialism in 
both theory and practice. At the heart of Deleuze’s ethics is the attempt to see 
things in terms of themselves as much as possible. Not that this is guaranteed 
to make the world a better place, but at the very least it might make it more 
authentic. 
Deleuze calls this “choosing to have a choice” in which “the 
alternative is not between terms but between the modes of existence of the 
one who chooses,” for which he credits Pascal’s Wager and Kierkegaard’s 
Either/Or as the first texts to develop this insight.83 The true choice is not to 
have a life or to create affects, especially not since such matters are highly 
asubjective. The self, strictly speaking, does not have the capacity to realize 
the proper mode of existence, much like the knight of faith cannot exist 
without God restoring the finite for him. The true choice is to believe that a 
life and affect are possible in this world. Only “the character who makes [this] 
true choice raises the affect to its pure power or potentiality.”84 In his final 
essay, Deleuze cites a Dickens story that perhaps illustrates best how the 
affect-creating potential of art can become manifest in life itself: 
 
A scoundrel, a bad apple, held in contempt by everyone, 
is found on the point of death, and suddenly those 
charged with his care display an urgency, respect, and 
even love for the dying man’s least sign of life. Everyone 
                                                 
82 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 134. Also see Deleuze and Parnet, 
Dialogues, 61. In a striking parallel, it was Kierkegaard who introduced the word experiment into 
Danish, as well as the explicit notion of experimenting not experimenting with or on, but a 
character. See pages xxii-xxxi of the 1993 International Kierkegaard Commentary. 
83 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 114-116; Deleuze, Cinema 2, 177. 
84 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 115. 
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makes it his business to save him. As a result, the wicked 
man himself, in the depths of his coma, feels something 
soft and sweet penetrate his soul. But as he progresses 
back toward life, his benefactors turn cold, and he 
himself rediscovers his old vulgarity and meanness. 
Between his life and his death, there is a moment where 
a life is merely playing with death.85 
 
This demonstrates why the preferable mode of existence, a moment 
in which the fourth person singular is attained, is strictly speaking beyond 
good and evil, since “only the subject that incarnated [a life] in the midst of 
things made it good or bad.”86 And this is why Deleuzian ethics are perhaps 
existentialist before being anything else. Authenticity resides in the demand 
that the value of an act, of a production of something, can never be drawn from 
a cherished history, an envisioned future, a desire felt, or a norm obeyed. To 
be authentic is to even purge one’s own presence from the affect under 
consideration, and to evaluate only it in terms of the feelings, perceptions and 
consequences that it might bring about. And finally, unlike the knight of faith, 
this can no longer concern every waking moment. Much more, it is the kind 
of rare occurrence that demands sobriety, work, and the kind of restricted 
optimism of one who merely labors to bring about something new, as humble 
as the result may be. 
 
Center for Contemporary European Philosophy, 
Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
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